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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is on appeal before this court a second time following the issued in 
Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524, 181 P.3d 45 (2008). The case was remanded 
with direction to the trial court to dismiss Jorgensen's complaint with prejudice. 
On remand, Coppedges submitted a motion and notice of motion to fix attorneys 
fees and an accompanying memorandum of costs and attorneys fees. (LR p. 16-22).1 
Jorgensen filed a motion to disallow costs and attorney fees. Jorgensen asserted 
Coppedges were not the prevailing party because they failed to prevail on their 
counterclaims. Alternatively, Jorgensen argued that should the trial court apportion costs 
and fees, any fees awarded to Coppedges should be minimal in light of the fact that their 
counsel had researched the 1menforceability issue in April and May 2005, which would 
have terminated Jorgensen's claim, but did not raise the issue until trial. (LR p. 49-54). 
In response to Jorgensen's motion, Coppedges filed an opposition memorandum 
claiming they were the prevailing party when one considered the amounts involved in the 
litigation. Coppedges also urged the trial court to consider settlement negotiations in its 
assessment of the prevailing party. 
In response to the apportionment issue, Coppedges claimed it was a combination 
of Jorgensen's complaint and demand for jury trial, accompanied by Jorgensen's failure 
to recognize that the covenant was unenforceable which caused the delay in the 
interpretation of the contract.2 LRp. 55-70 .. At the hearing on the motion to disallow, 
Coppedges also claimed that Jorgensen's allegation in the complaint that the agieement 
1 Plaintiffs have adopted Defendants use of "LR" to refer to the "limited" Clerk's Transcript and "LTr" to 
refer to the "limited" Reporter's Transcript per this Court's Order Augmenth1g Record issued August 22, 
2008. 
2 Jorgensen did not demand the jury trial. Coppedges demanded it in their answer. R p. 14. 
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was a franchise agreement prevented them from having the covenant not to compete 
clause interpreted as a matter oflaw by the court sooner.3 LTr p. 20, L. 20-25; p. 21, L. 
1-14. 
In ruling upon Jorgensen's motion to disallow costs and attorneys fees, the district 
court found that Coppedges were not the prevailing party. In its ruling given in open 
court on July 9, 2008, the district court held: 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Ms. Weeks. Well, I am 
going to grantthe motion to disallow costs and attorney's fees. Well, 
costs are awarded as a matter of right, bufthe attorney's fees, that's 
discretionary, and I am granting the motion to disallow attorney's fees for 
two reasons. First ofall, I agree that even though it was the plaintiffs that 
brought the case and the defendants are responding, the defendants 
brought counterclaims that they chose to file, and they vigorously pursued 
that, and it might have only been a thousand dollars of attorney's fees, I 
don't know, but time was spent at trial dealing with those counterclaims, 
and the defendants did not prevail on those, so I'm viewing this as a split 
decisions and that there is no prevailing party. 
The other reason I am reluctant to award attorney's fees on behalf 
of the defendant following the remittitur and the Supreme Court's 
decision, it really focused on the covenant and the overbreadth nature of it, 
that wasn't raised until just before trial, a week before trial or it might be 
two weeks, whenever the pretrial brief is due, but I have a vague 
recollection that didn't discuss that until we actually got into trial, and I 
may have well had a better shot at making the right decision regarding that 
issue if it wasn't in the heat of trial, and according to the Supreme Court I 
missed the boat, and I'll take my medicine and trust them that they're 
right, and I feel badly that fees were expended by both parties after that · 
decision of mine during trial, but you know, I think had this been 
something that was raised in a separate motion, summary judgment 
motion or motion to dismiss prior to really being in the throws (sic) of 
trial, I think I can do my job better, and I'm not criticizing defense for the 
timing of the motion. It's just that -
Ms. Dean (sic): Can I add something to that, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Let me explain my ruling. And I think it would be 
unfair to basically put all the freight for that timing, and again, I'm not 
3 Jorgensen's complaint did not claim the agreement was a franchise. Rather, the sales agreement itself, 
attached to the complaint, indicated that Acology was purchasing all interest in the compounding division 
and accepting a "franchise" position under the terms of the agreement. 
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faulting the defense for that timing, but at this point it does seem to me to 
be unfair to saddle the plaintiff with all fees really for the whole litigation 
if the timing were different it may be that we wouldn't have even had a 
trial, and so that's - that's the alternative reason. 
LTr p. 18 L. 2-25; p. 19 L. 1-21. (Emphasis added.) 
The trial court proceeded to analyze Coppedges' request that he utilize settlement 
negotiations to determine the prevailing party and declined to do so based upon I.RE. 
408. LTr p. 19, L. 19-25; p. 20, L. 1-18. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEALLA.R. 35(b)(4) 
1. May the trial court allow costs to party pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(!)(B) without 
awarding attorney fees to the same party? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review of a trial court's determination of a prevailing party was 
enunciated in Rockefeller v. Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 545, 82 P.3d 450 (2003), wherein 
this court held: 
The determination of who is the prevailing party in a lawsuit is committed 
to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its determination will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 
792, 53 P.3d 1211 (2002). In malcing a determination of whether a trial 
court abused its discretion, this Court considers: (1) whether the trial court 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial 
court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) 
whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Polk 
v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 17 P.3d 247 (2000). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Legal Standards 
It is not disputed that this matter falls within the ambit ofI.C. § 12-120(3) for the 
analysis of an award of attorney fees. In the recent case of Shore v. Peterson, Idaho 
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__ , _ P.3d _, 2009 WL 540542 (2009), this Court provided a comprehensive 
analysis of the determination of a prevailing party in an action and held: 
A prevailing party in an action is entitled to certain costs as a matter of 
right and may, in some cases, also be awarded discretionary costs and 
attorney fees, Idaho R, Civ. P. 54(d)(l). A determination on prevailing 
parties is committed to the discretion of the trial court. Eighteen Mile 
Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 718-19, 
117 P.3d 130, 132-33 (2005). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(B) 
guides courts' inquiries on the prevailing party question. Id. at 719, 117 
P.3d at 133. That rule provides: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and 
entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion 
consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to 
the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court in its 
sound discretion may determine that a party to an action 
prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding 
may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair 
and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and 
claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or 
judgments obtained. 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(B), In determining which party prevailed where 
there are claims and counterclaims between opposing parties, the court 
determines who prevailed "in the action"; that is, the prevailing party 
question is examined and determined from an overall view, not a claim-
by-claim analysis. Eighteen Mile, 141 ldaho at 719,117 P.3d at 133. 
Only in rare cases has this Conrt or the Court of Appeals reversed a trial 
court's determination of which party prevailed. In Eighteen Mile, we 
reversed the trial court's determination that although the defendants had 
successfully defended against plaintiffs complaint, because they 
recovered only a small portion of what they desired on their counterclaim, 
they were not prevailing parties. Id. at 719, 117 P.3d at 133. In that case 
we emphasized that a defendant's non-liability is evidence that it is the 
prevailing party. In Daisy Manufacturing Co. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 
Idaho 259,999 P.2d 914 (Ct.App.2000), the Court of Appeals observed: 
"The 'result obtained' in this case was a dismissal of [plaintiffs] action 
with prejudice, the most favorable outcome that could possibly be 
achieved by [ a defendant], [The plaintiff] gained no benefit as a 
consequence of the litigation." Id. at 262,999 P.2d at 917, Those cases 
illustrate that a defendant may be the prevailing party when he or she is 
ultimately found not liable. 
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When both parties are partially successful, however, it is within the court's 
discretion to decline an award of attorney fees to either side. Israel v. 
Leachman, 139 Idaho 24, 27, 72 PJd 864,867 (2003). In Israel, the 
plaintiffs prevailed on their claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection 
Act, but did not prevail on their claims for breach of contract, statutory 
violations, and fraud. Id. at 25-26, 72 PJd at 865-66. We affirmed the 
district court's decision to award no attorney fees because it determined 
that both parties prevailed in part. Id. at 28, 72 P.3d 864, 72 P.3d at 868. 
The district court's determination of who is a prevailing party will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Trilogy Network Sys., Inc. v. 
Johnson, 144Idaho 844,847, 172P.3d 1119, 1122(2007). When 
examining whether a trial court abused its discretion, this Court considers 
whether the trial court: (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
acted within the outer boundaries of this discretion and consistently with 
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. (affirming the trial court's 
decision that each party bear its own costs in a case where a plaintiff 
successfully showed a breach of contract, but failed to provide adequate 
evidence to show damages that were not mere speculation.) 
B. Coppedges are not Entitled to Attorney Fees as a Matter of Right because the 
Trial Court Allowed them Costs 
In this matter, Jorgensen timely objected to an award of costs and attorney fees to 
Coppedges on the grounds that they were not the prevailing party. LR p. 49-51. In the 
alternative, Jorgensen contended that if the trial court apportioned attorney fees that any 
apportionment to Coppedges should be minimal and challenged specific court costs 
claimed by Coppedges. LR p. 51-53. 
Following the hearing on the matter, the trial court determined that neither party. 
prevailed in the matter and declined to award attorney fees to either. The trial court 
determined that neither party prevailed because both unsuccessfully pursued claims 
against the other. The trial court articulated the basis of its decision, citing to the final 
judgment and result of the action in relation to the relief sought by each of the respective 
parties and determined there was no prevailing party. LTr p. 18, L. 1-16. 
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Coppedges do not attack the trial court's ruling in this portion of its appeal. 
Rather, they point to the fact that at the same time as the court disallowed the attorney 
fees requested as costs because there was no prevailing party, it allowed Coppedges' costs 
in the amount of$600. LTr p. 18, L. 1-16; p. 22, L 7-11. 
Despite the trial court's specific finding at the hearing that Coppedges were not a 
prevailing party, which finding was incorporated into the court's order entered in this 
matter, Coppedges contend on appeal that they were found to be a prevailing party and 
are therefore entitled to costs. 4 Coppedges cite to no authority for this proposition. 
Instead, Coppedges contend that because the trial court awarded them court costs as a 
matter of right that they are the prevailing party in the matter notwithstanding the direct 
finding by the court enunciated at the hearing to the contrary. 
Coppedges' position on appeal ignores the specific findings of the trial court that 
Coppedges were not the prevailing party. In partial support of their argument, 
Coppedges point out that Jorgensen did not file a cross-appeal in this matter and conclude 
that their position as a prevailing party is therefore established .. In. essence, Coppedges 
argue that Jorgensen may not raise the specific findings of the court enunciated at the 
hearing and incorporated into its written order because he did not file a cross-appeal in 
this matter. Coppedges conclude that based upon the fact that there was no cross appeal 
that this Court must ignore the trial court's specific ruling that Coppedges were not a 
prevailing party and rule on appeal that they are entitled to attorney fees as a matter of 
right. 
Jorgensen was not required to raise the specific findings of the Court, which are 
incorporated in the written order, as an issue on a cross-appeal. Pursuant to I.A.R. 15, a 
4 LRp. 78 
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respondent is required to file a cross-appeal if affirmative relief by way of reversal, 
vacation or modification of the judgment is sought. Idaho Appellate Rule 15( a) provides 
in relevant part that: "If no affirmative relief is sought by way of reversal, vacation or 
modification of the judgment, order or decree, an issue may be presented by the 
respondent as an additional issue on appeal under Rule 35(b)(4) without filing a cross-
appea!." In Miller v. Board a/Trustees, 132 Idaho 244,970 P.2d 512 (1998), this Court 
recognized that a respondent can make any argument to sustain a lower court's judgment 
' 
without filing a cross-appeal. Concomitantly. LA.R. 35(b)(4) provides in the event the 
respondent contends that the issues presented on appeal listed in appellant's brief are 
insufficient, incomplete, or raise additional issues for review, the respondent may list 
additional issues presented on appeal in the same form as prescribed in Rule 35(a)(4). 
Coppedges issues are insufficient, incomplete and raise additional issues for 
review because Coppedges choose to ignore the trial court's analysis and specific finding, 
which were incorporated into its written order, that there was no prevailing party in this 
matter. Further, Coppedges fail to address the specific language ofLR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) 
which allows the trial court to apportion costs between parties when they have prevailed 
in part and not prevailed in part in a manner it deems fair and equitable. In fact, Idaho 
case law supports that the trial court may award costs as a matter of right to both parties 
in an action on those causes upon which the party prevailed. See Ramco v. H-K 
Contractors, Inc., 118 Idaho 108, 113, 794 P.2d 1381, 1386 (1990). Instead, Coppedges 
rely upon the fact that they deem the order internally inconsistent and therefore ask this 
Court to deem them a prevailing party in direct contradiction of the trial court's finding. 
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This request is inconsistent with the standards set out in Shore v. Peterson, supra and 
Ramco v. H-K Contractors, Inc., supra. 
C. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion when it Determined that Neither 
Party Prevailed 
Coppedges claim that the trial court abused its discretion in this matter by finding 
there was no prevailing party for two reasons. The first is that Coppedges won on the 
main issue in the case. The second is that the counterclaims would have been advanced 
as affirmative defenses and therefore the time devoted to the counterclaims was 
insignificantly different than the time that would have been devoted to the counterclaim. 
1. Coppedges did not Prevail on the Main Issue in the Case 
Turning to the first claim, Coppedges vaguely define the "main issue" in the case 
as.the issue that brought the parties to court without further analysis. The isfue that 
brought the parties to court was a sales agreement. It contained covenants not to compete 
applicable to both Jorgensen and Coppedges which this Court ruled were unenforceable 
reciprocal covenants. 
Throughout the litigation, both sides claimed the other had breached their 
covenant not to compete .and claimed there were damages from the breaches.5 In 
addition, Coppedges claimed fraud in the inducement and sought damages for that claim. 
Coppedges claim on appeal that they prevailed on "the only claim that mattered in 
the case, a claim Jorgensen valued at well over a million", and the trial court abused its 
discretion by failing to recognize this fact. Coppedges' counterclaims were not 
insignificant. Coppedges indicated in their trial brief filed approximately one week 
5 Even though Coppedges claimed that their covenant not to compete was unenforceable, they never took 
that position with respect to Jorgensen's covenant. At no time did they express any intent to withdraw their 
claims that this covenant had been breached. 
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before trial that part of the damages they were seeking included the return of payments 
they made on the contract over the course of three (3) years.6 Coppedges also advanced a 
new basis for their claim of breach of contract, claiming that discovery they received 
allegedly revealed Jorgensen had breached the sales agreement by retaining customer 
lists and customer information contained in retained computer data and using the 
information in violation of the sales agreement. Coppedges reiterated that they sought a 
refund of all the money he paid Jorgensen over the course of the contract. R 55-71. 
Coppedges valued their counterclaims to the jury at a minimum of $452,000. Tr Vol. III, 
p. 1157 L. 6-8; Vol. III, p. 1198, L. 4-23; Vol. III p. 1205, L. 23-25; p. 1206, L. 1-3. 
As to the trial of the counterclaims, the trial court observed that Coppedges 
vigorously pursued their counterclaims at trial. LTr p. 18, L. 12-14. It was not an abuse 
of discretion for the trial court to consider that these counterclaims were as relevant to the 
case as Jorgensen's claims. 
Coppedges claim that the inappropriate consideration of their counterclaims by 
the trial court in its prevailing party analysis placed them in the same position as the 
prevailing defendants in Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 
141 Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 130 (2005), and Chadderdon v. King., 104 Idaho 406,659 P.2d 
160, (Ct. App.1983) and was therefore error. Coppedges characterize these two cases as 
ones where defendants defeated plaintiffs' claims even though they either lost or secured 
a Pyrrhic victory on their counterclaims and yet were still deemed prevailing parties. 
6 !n the figures that Coppedges provided the trial court at hearing of the attorney time devoted to the 
counterclaims, no mention was made of time devoted in discovery to the counterclaims or time devoted to 
address them in the trial brief, yet it is appareut in the record that they were addressed in the trial brief, and 
the trial briefreferenced discovery done on the counterclaims. 
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Neither Eighteen Mile nor Chadderdon support Coppedges' position. In Eighteen 
Mile, some of the defendants were dismissed from the case and one of the defendants 
avoided liability on plaintiffs claim and recovered a small amount on a counterclaim. 
The Eighteen Mile court overruled the trial court's finding that the defendants were not 
prevailing parties, noting that the trial court failed to appreciate that avoiding a verdict 
was as important as winning a verdict. Coppedges are not in the same position. 
Although they may have avoided a verdict against them, they brought and pursued 
counterclaims and lost on their counterclaims. 
As to the claim that Chadderdon applies in this matter to support a finding of 
abuse of discretion, this case analyzed a contract clause allowing costs and fees to the 
prevailing party in an action between a building owners and a contractor. The owner did 
not prevail in his suit against the builder. The builder did not prevail in his counterclaim 
against the owner. The owner urged a narrow interpretation of prevailing party rule to 
only apply if affirmative relief was awarded. The trial court rejected this interpretation, 
finding that the owner's claim was the main issue of the case that consumed the majority 
of the time at trial, and the builder was the prevailing party. The Chadderdon court 
agreed that the narrow interpretation advanced by the owner was not appropriate and 
affirmed the trial court. 
Chadderdon certainly stands for the proposition that the trial court may review the 
case and the issues heard at trial and determine which ones were the main issues in its 
prevailing party analysis. However, it does not stand for the proposition that plaintiffs 
claims are always the main issue at trial or that defendant's counterclaims are always 
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minor issues. Rather, it discusses an analysis that has to be made in each case by the trial 
court based upon the facts of that specific case. 
Apparently, Coppedges desire a mathematical approach to the prevailing party 
analysis. Since their claim was smaller, they deem that their issues were not main issues. 
However, the determination of which party has prevailed is not a matter ofa mechanical 
measurement of the size of each party's respective recovery. Ramco v. H-K Contractors, 
Inc., 118 Idaho 108, 113, 794 P.2d 1381, 1386 (1990). 
2. Affirmative Defenses and D~fensive Counterclaims 
Coppedges downplay the role of their counterclaims at trial to support their claim 
that the trial court abused its discretion in its prevailing party analysis by not taking this 
factor into consideration. They contend the evidence they presented would have been 
admitted anyway as part of their affirmative defenses anyway. At the hearing, 
Coppedges counsel informed the trial court that the time he had worked on pleadings for 
the affirmative defenses was minimal, stating," ... so I can tell you in going through the 
bills that I can't find more than a thousand dollars of time that was related to the event 
that were - the counterclaim itself, and that would be the additional jury instructions that 
were done and drafting of the counterclaim itself." LTr p. 11, L. 10-19. In response to 
this argument, during delivery of the trial court's opinion, it noted that" ... the defendant 
brought counterclaims that they chose to file, and they vigorously pursued that, and it 
might have only been a thousand dollars of attorney's fees, I don't !mow, but time was 
spent at trial dealing with those counterclaims ... " L Tr p. 18, L. 9-14. Thus, the trial 
court reached its decision regarding the importance of the counterclaims to the case 
through an exercise of reason based in part upon what it observed at trial of the matter. 
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Coppedges also claim the trial court abused its discretion by failing to take into 
consideration in its analysis the fact that their counterclaims were incorporated into their 
affirmative defenses. Coppedges cite to no authority nor do they present any argument in 
support of their claim that a trial court abuses its discretion in reviewing counterclaims 
that might have also been plead as affirmative defenses in its analysis of the prevailing 
party. Further, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) does not list this factor as one that is to be considered 
by the trial court in its determination of the prevailing party, and it was not an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to follow the rule. 
Further, the fact that some of Coppedges claims may .have been compulsory 
counterclaims is ofno weight. In Hutchinson v. Kelton, 99 Idaho 866, 590 P.2d 1012 
(1979) the defendant on appeal claimed that it was error for the trial court to consider in 
its prevailing party analysis the outcome of the defendant's compulsory counterclaims 
because they were required to bring them. After reviewing the applicable rule and 
standards, the Hutchinson court ruled that the trial court committed no error in 
considering the outcome on the compulsory counterclaims as part of its prevailing party 
analysis. 
3. There was no Abuse of Discretion 
In reviewing the trial court's decision on the prevailing party, this Court first 
inquires if the trial court perceived the matter as one of discretion. The court's ruling 
demonstrates it did. 
The next inquiry is whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of this 
discretion. and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it. Despite Coppedges position that it was entitled to a ruling that it was a 
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prevailing party because plaintiff did not prevail on its claim against Coppedges, in 
International Engineering Co. Inc. v. Daum Indus., Inc., 106 Idaho 363, 679 P.2d 640 
(1984) this Court held where plaintiff prevailed on some claims and defendant prevailed 
on a counterclaim, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that there was no 
prevailing party. Similarly, in Shore v. Peterson, supra, this Court also held that when 
both parties are partially successful that it is within the court's discretion to decline an 
award of attorney fees to either side. Thus, the trial court in this matter acted within the 
boundaries of its discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards. 
The final inquiry is whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason. In this matter, the trial court's ruling shows it was guided by considerations in 
the rule governing the determination of prevailing party status. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). 
The trial court looked at the claims involved, the final judgment or result, and the extent 
to which each party prevailed on the claims. Thus, this prong is also met. The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in determining that there was no prevailing party. 
D. Coppedges Inappropriately Request that this Court Remove the Discretion 
Granted the Trial Court's pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l)(B) 
In the portion of their brief seeking fees without apportionment, Coppedges 
request that should this Court remand the issue of attorney fees to the trial court that it 
include instructions in the remand to the trial court that it may not exercise its discretion 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) and apportion fees. Fundamentally, Coppedges ask this 
Court to place itself in the shoes of the trial court and determine that Coppedges were the 
prevailing party. Coppedges claim such action is necessary because the comments of the 
trial court made it clear in the present case that it was denying Coppedges attorney fees to 
vindicate its sense of justice beyond the judgment rendered. This claim is without merit. 
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The trial court made clear that it was finding that neither party prevailed and as 
such, an award of attorney fees was not warranted. The court chose to address the 
apportionment arguments raised by Coppedges as an alternative. The trial comt did not 
need to address this matter as it had already found that neither party prevailed. Thus, this 
Court need not address. this issue on appeal. 
Should this Court decide to review the trial·court's comments as requested on 
appeal, these comments do not indicate that the trial court was employing its own view of 
equity to determine Coppedges entitlement to an award. Rather, they were directed 
toward why the court was not apportioning considering the factors required by Rule 
54(e)(3), I.R.C.P. 
The trial court indicated it would not have ordered apportionment of fees because 
Coppedges did not bring pre-trial motions, such as a motion to dismiss [for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief could be granted] or a motion for summary judgment which 
might have prevented the matter proceeding to trial. LTr p. 17 L. 17-25; p. 18, L. 1-21. 
In a footnote to their appellate brief, Coppedges claim the trial ~ourt should not 
have considered the failure to bring timely pre-trial motions in addressing the amount to 
award utilizing the factors of Rule 54(e)(3). Coppedges claim they should not bear any 
responsibility for the failure to bring timely pre-trial motions. (Appellant's Briefp. 7-8.) 
In their submittal to the trial court on the issue, Coppedges claimed they could not 
have raised the issue ofunenforceability by summary judgment because it would have 
first required the Court to decide whether the contract created a franchise as plaintiffs 
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initially alleged in their complaint LR p. 57.7 The issue of franchise was not raised in 
the complaint, however franchise language was contained in the agreement. 
Regardless, this argument was undercut by Coppedges own trial brief. In 
Coppedges' trial brief, Coppedges cited to case authority and proposed to the court that 
the contract was not enforceable as a franchise as a matter of law. R p. 63, Along the 
same lines, Coppedges' trial brief also argued to the court that the clause requiring the 
$12,000 monthly payment was an "illegal" covenant not to compete and was 
unenforceable as a matter oflaw. Rp. 63-70. Thus, the trial court could have 
determined these issues short of trial. Yet Coppedges never brought any pre-trial 
motions. 
Coppedges claim that because the trial court expressed an opinion that the amount 
of fees were not reasonable given the lack of such pre-trial motions that the trial court 
clearly decided to deny an award as a means to vindicate its sense of justice beyond the 
judgment rendered in violation of the holding of Eighteen lvfile Ranch, LLC v, Nord 
Excavating & Paving, Inc,, 141 Idaho 716,720, 117 P.3d 130, 134 (2005). However, the 
comment of the court was a comment on what the court deemed a reasonable 
apportionment in light of Coppedges' ability to potentially have terminated the litigation 
sooner through pre-trial motion practice, Contrary to Coppedges claim, the trial courts 
action was not a denial of attorney fees with an equitable view toward the outcome of the 
underlying transaction as was prohibited in De Wils Interiors, Inc. v. Dines, I 06 Idaho 
288,678 P.2d 80 (Ct. App. 1984). 
7 The issue of franchise was not raised in the complaint, however franchise language was contained in the 
agreement 
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In awarding fees to an attorney, it is proper for the court to evaluate whether the 
time and labor actually expended by an attorney was reasonable under the circumstances. 
In Daisy Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259,263, 999 P.2d 914, 918 
(Ct.App.2000), the trial court was concerned that the prevailing party did not inform the 
opponent until the eve of trial that it was not the proper party. The Court of Appeals 
held, "An attorney carmot 'spend' his time extravagantly and expect to be compensated 
by the party who loses at trial. Hence, a court may disallow fees that were unnecessarily 
and unreasonably incurred or that were the product of attorney 'churning."' The Court of 
Appeals indicated it was reasonable for the trial court to look at this factor in determining 
the reasonableness of fees, but not in determining which parties prevailed. 
E. The Coppedges are not Entitled to Attorney Fees Without Apportionment 
Coppedges argue that if this matter is remanded back to the trial court, they are 
entitled to an instruction that fees are not to be apportioned. In essence, Coppedges argue 
that this Court should deem them the prevailing party contrary to the trial court's ruling. 
Coppedges base this argument on two premises. 
The first premise is that their counterclaims should have been disregarded by the 
trial court in its prevailing party analysis because they were defensive in nature. This 
argument has been previously dealt with at length in this brief under section IV.C.2. To 
summarize that section, there is no authority for the proposition that it was error for the 
trial court not to consider this factor. Even if it was error for the trial court not to 
consider this factor in its prevailing party analysis, there is no basis or authority for this 
court removing the trial court's discretion on a remand to prevent the trial court from 
correcting its error and properly exercising its discretion. 
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The other premise is that the trial court erred by not considering settlement 
negotiations as part of its prevailing party analysis. Coppedges really do not provide any 
explanation why this court should remand with a directive that the trial court can not 
exercise its discretion if the trial court abused its discretion. 
Coppedges claim the trial court committed error because it would not consider 
affidavits regarding settlement negotiations which they submitted in support of their 
attorney fee request and therefore the case should be remanded with directions that there 
be no apportionment. Coppedges claims that such evidence has been allowed in other 
cases to determine an award of attorney fees. 
Co:ppedges rely upon Etcheverry Sheep Co. v. JR. Simplot Co., 113 Idaho 15, 18 
(1985) for the proposition that a district court is not precluded from considering pretrial 
settlement negotiations in determining whether the criteria ofl.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) have been . . 
established. While acknowledging this holding applied to awards under LC.§ 12-120, 
Coppedges argue this Court should extended this holding to a request for attorneys' fees 
under LC.§ 12-120(3). The portion of Etcheverry quoted by Coppedges comes from 
Sigdestad v. Gold,106 ldaho 693, 682 P.2d 646 (Ct. App. 1984). 
Both Etcheverry, supra, and Sigdestad, supra, have been overruled. In Severson 
v. Hermann, 116 Idaho 497, 777 P.2d 269 (] 989), the plaintiff asserted that the trial court 
abused its discretion in holding that matters extrajudicial to a jury trial could constitute 
grounds for an award of attorney's fees. In analyzing the issue, the court held: 
Hermann notes that in Etcheverry Sheep Co. v. JR. Simplot Co., 113 
Idaho 15, 18, 740 P.2d 57, 61 (1987) we stated that a ,;district court is not 
precluded from considering pretrial settlement negotiations in determining 
whether the criteria of Rule 54(e)(l) have been established." 113 Idaho at 
18, 740 P.2d at 60-61. In light of Anderson v. Anderson, 116 Idaho 359, 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF: 17 
775 P.2d 1201, (1989), Etcheverry is not authority for the trial court to 
consider matters outside the record. In Anderson we explained that: 
Just last year this Court reasserted our earlier holding in Payne v. 
Foley, 102 Idaho 760,639 P.2d 1126 (1982), that in determining 
whether or not to award attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 the trial 
courts may not consider the extent of any settlement negotiations 
which the parties may or may not have engaged in. In Ross v. 
Coleman, 114 Idaho 817, at 836, 761 P.2d 1169, at 1188 (1988), 
this Court quoting from Payne stated, "There is no authority in a 
trial court to insist upon, oversee, or second guess settlement 
negotiations, if any, and certainly no authority to impose 
sanctions for 'bad faith' bargaining." Ross v. Coleman overruled 
Sigdestad v. Gold sub silento. We again affirm our holdings in 
Payne v. Foley, and Ross v. Coleman, i.e., "that the failure to 
enter into or conduct settlement negotiations is not a basis for 
awarding attorney fees under LC.§ 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 
54(e)(l)." Id. The language in Sigdestad v. Gold, 106 Idaho 693, 
682 P.2d 646 (Ct.App.1984), to the contrary is in error and is 
expressly disapproved. 
Id. at 277. 
Given the above analysis, it would not be appropriate to extend Etcheverry to claims 
under I.C. § 12-120(3). 
Coppedges claim that Yellowpine Water User's Assn 't v. Imel, 105 Idaho 349 
(1983) is in accord with Etcheverry because a pre-litigation tender of an amount owing 
was discussed in the case. In making their argument that Yellowpine stands for the 
proposition that a trial court can utilize settlement negotiations in determining a 
prevailing party, Coppedges do not recognize the distinction between a tender of an 
. amount that a party admits is owed and a settlement offer. 
In Yellowpine, Imel never disputed that he owed a bill of $26 and he tendered that 
amount before litigation. Y ellowpine was awarded that amount in the litigation. 
Yellowpine did not recover the remainder of the amount it claimed was owed in its 
complaint. Imel did not recover on his consumer protection act counterclaim. Citing to 
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Hutchinson v. Kelton, 99 Idaho 866,590 P.2d 1012 (1979), the Yellowpine court 
concluded that Y ellowpine was not a prevailing party in the action. Thus, it is important 
to review the holding of Hutchinson. 
In Hutchinson v. Kelton, supra, the plaintiffs sought $15,178.47 in damages. The 
defendants counterclaimed for $89,000 damages. The plaintiffs admitted to owing $50 
for payment toward preparation of a lease. The jury found against the plaintiffs on their 
complaint and against the defendants on their counterclaim. Defendants sought attorney 
fees based upon the successful defense against plaintiffs claim and the recovery of the 
$50 plaintiffs admitted was owed. The trial court indicated it would be an abuse of 
discretion to find that defendants were the prevailing party under the circumstances of the 
case. 
On appeal, the Hutchison court observed that "[t]he thrust of the defendants' 
contention is that they did recover $50 on one of their causes of action in their 
counterclaim whereas, the plaintiffs recovered nothing, and that they successfully 
defended against the plaintiffs' complaint. As to their loss on their counterclaim, they 
explain that the counterclaim was compulsory in nature, and utilized as a defensive 
measure." After reviewing the standards of I.R.C.P. 54( d)(J )(B), the Hutchinson court 
affirmed the trial court's decision. 
Rather than supporting Coppedges position, Yellowpine, supra, and Hutchinson, 
supra, support a denial of the appeal in this matter. Neither case looked outside the trial 
record to determine the prevailing party. Further, the Hutchinson court was unpersuaded 
that it should disregard the defendants' losses because they were defensive in nature (i.e. 
compulsory counterclaims). The appellate court upheld the trial courts' determination 
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that there was no prevailing party because of the failure of the plaintiffs to substantially 
prevail on their claim and the failure of the defendants to substantially prevail on their 
claim. Based upon these rulings, the trial court in the present case did not commit error 
in determining neither party prevailed. 
Finally, Coppedges claim that the same result as was obtained in Yellowpine 
Water User's Ass 'n, supra, occurred in Medical Recovery Services, LLC v. Jones, 145 
Idaho 406, 175 P.3d 795 (Ct. App. 2007). This is not true. Medical Recovery Services 
dealt with completely different issues. As discussed previously, the Yellowpine court was 
analyzing the prevailing party based upon results sought and results obtained in litigation. 
The Medical Recovery Services court Was dealing with whether attorney fees were 
necessarily and reasonably incurred following admission of the alleged amount owed in 
the complaint and payment thereof within four days of receipt of the complaint. 
In Medical Recovery Services, the magistrate was not analyzing settlement offers 
made in the case in light of the results obtained to determine if the party prevailed. 
Rather, he was dealing with a situation where the defendant did not dispute the 
allegations of the complaint that a debt was owed and paid the debt within four days of 
service of the suit. The defendant requested to be provided the amount of attorney fees 
so those also could be paid. Rather than supplying the figure for payment, the attorney 
prepared pleadings to obtain attorney fees. The trial court disallowed a large portion of 
the fees, finding they had been incurred after payment of the debt and an offer to tender 
the attorney fees, and therefore were not reasonably incurred. On appeal, the attorney 
claimed the magistrate should not have considered the payment of the debt and the tender 
of the attorney fees, and also claimed the court was vindicating its sense of justice beyond 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF: 20 
the judgment rendered. The Medical Recovery Services court agreed that it was proper 
for the trial court to consider that the majority of the attorney work occurred after 
admission and payment of the debt as a I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) factor because a majority of the 
work was unrelated to litigating the debt. The greater part of the time was devoted to 
collecting attorney fees after the fact, which work could have been avoided by providing 
the debtor the requested figures to pay the debt. 
The Medical Recovery Services court did not hold that the court could consider 
settlement negotiations in determining how to apportion fees in a prevailing party 
analysis as Coppedges claim, nor did it determine that settlement negotiations were an 
appropriate factor to consider under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). It merely indicated when a claim 
was not disputed, the attorney would not be allowed to churn the matter to obtain a larger 
attorney fee award. The case is inapposite to this proceeding. Coppedges never 
admitted a debt and the issue is not one of whether Jorgensen's counsel spent unneeded 
time on the matter to increase the amount of the fee recovery. 
Coppedges claim it was error for the trial court to rely upon Rule 408, I.R.C.P. 
and refuse to consider their submittals. 8 The trial court's disregard of Coppedges' 
settlement negotiation submittals was not error. 
The mediation agreement signed by the parties in this matter indicated the parties 
agreed the fact of mediation and statements made therein were not admissible. LR p. 66. 
Rule 408, I.R.E. is clear that evidence of compromise negotiations is not admissible. 
Likewise, I.R.E. 507, provided that mediation communications were privileged and 
8 On July l, 2008, the Idaho legislature enacted the Uniform Mediation Act, Title 9, Chapter 8, which also 
supports the trial court's decision. 
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inadmissible in a proceeding unless the other party agreed to waive the privilege.9 
Coppedges' position that a trial court should consider settlement negotiations in 
determining prevailing parties or fee apportionment would potentially chill settlement 
negotiations. It would add the concern that if a party engaged in such negotiations that 
they might be used against the party in an attorney fee analysis. Further, there would be 
fear that a party might not accurately represent the course of the negotiation to the court 
in its attempt to obtain or avoid fees, which would lead to further litigation costs and 
expenses. Finally, to allow this factor to become part of the attorney fee analysis would 
invite exactly the type of activity that Ross v. Coleman, 114 ldaho 817, 761 P.2d 1169, 
(1988), warned against, which is the authority for a trial court to oversee, or second guess 
settlement negotiations. The trial court did not abuse its discretion and commit error in 
declining to consider this factor. 
F. Coppedges are not Entitled to a Remand on the Issue of Apportionment for Post-
T rial Matters 
On appeal, Coppedges claim at a minimum that they were entitled to an award for 
post-trial briefing and hearing on motions because they did not involve their 
counterclaims. In other words, Coppedges claim that the trial court abused its discretion 
by not apportioning them these costs. In making these arguments, the Coppedges do not 
demonstrate that the trial court acted outside the boundaries of its discretion or did not 
reach its decision through an exercise of reason. 
9 I.R.C.P 507 was changed during the time the attorney fee matter was before the court. However, either 
version provided that the communication was privileged and inadmissible. 
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V. ATTORNEY FEES 
On appeal, Coppedges correctly note that Daisy Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Paintball Sports, 
134 Idaho 259, 263 (Ct. App. 2000) stands for the proposition that when an appeal 
subject to LC.§ 12-120 concerns the entitlement to fees as opposed to an award of fees 
on appeal that the prevailing party in the appeal is entitled to attorney fees. However, 
Coppedges appeal goes to the award of fees and they are not entitled to fees on appeal. 
SUBMITTED this 18th day of March, 2009. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
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